Mechanism Design -- Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments -- A Mechanism for Multiple Goods and Interdependent Valuations -- A Budget-Balanced, Incentive-Compatible Scheme for Social Choice -- An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions -- “CONFESS”. Eliciting Honest Feedback Without Independent Verification Authorities -- Generalized Knapsack Solvers for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions: Analysis and Application to Computational Resource Allocation -- Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents -- An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Comparison of Two Double-Auction Market Designs -- Trading Agents -- Auctions and Bidding with Information -- Multi-attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting -- Bidding for Customer Orders in TAC SCM -- Agents’ Strategies for the Dual Parallel Search in Partnership Formation Applications -- Three Automated Stock-Trading Agents: A Comparative Study -- Tools -- Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations -- iAuctionMaker: A Decision Support Tool for Mixed Bundling.